The government also wants to locate healthy Poles. "Regulations not in accordance with the GDPR and the Constitution"

Sick is not enough. The Anti-Crisis Shield 2.0 is to allow the collection of location data for all citizens - those with coronavirus, those in quarantine, those completely healthy.

Barely the Anti-crisis Shield has been introduced, there is already a draft of its amendment. The regulations proposed by the government, however, raise many doubts also related to the potential surveillance of citizens.

Three ways to locate citizens, including one very controversial

Fears are primarily raised by the amended Article 11 of the Act, which introduces the possibility of obtaining location data from operators of both healthy and sick people as well as those in quarantine of citizens. We are all equal in view of the epidemiological status.

In the first part of the amended article, we read that as part of counteracting COVID-19 during an epidemic emergency, epidemic or natural disaster status, the telecommunications operator is obliged to provide the minister of digitization with data from the last 14 days about the location of a user infected with coronavirus or covered by quarantine. The second part gives the minister the opportunity to obtain data on the location of terminal equipment of healthy citizens, although in this case, as the law emphasizes, they are to be anonymized. Details on how data will be provided and their scope are to be set out in the agreements between the ministry and the operators.

However, his last honor - the third - raises the greatest fears. It stipulates that the head of government, at the request of the minister, may issue to the operator and service provider providing services electronically to provide location data without the need to justify such a request.

The most controversial is the third mode of data transfer - says Spider's Web Wojciech Klicki from Panoptykon. - The regulations do not explain what situations it concerns. From the context it can be concluded that it does not apply to sick people, because it is contained in the first mode, or anonymized data, this is the second mode. By this I mean that the prime minister, at the request of the ministry of digitization, will be able to submit an application for access to the non-anonymized location of all telephones to be used "for analytical purposes". We are talking here not about the data of one person, hundreds or even thousands of people, but actually all users.

The way the new regulations are formulated leaves us unanswered with key questions and opens the gate that should not even be lifted without clear necessity and without clear restrictions on what rules this happens. Location data is particularly sensitive. They show not only where we live, where we work and which of the nearby pubs is our favorite, but also who we sneak out after dark, what doctors we visit, which psychiatrist we go to. Access to them should be best protected and given only when absolutely necessary.

In my opinion, in this form these provisions are not only compatible with the GDPR, which allows the use of such data only in cases where it is necessary, but also unconstitutional - adds Klicki.

This is a big step after the relatively uncontroversial applications of Quarantine and ProteGO

The amendment would give the rulers much more data than the current solutions. To date, the government's technological arsenal to fight coronavirsu contains one and a half applications - Quarantine and (still under construction) ProteGO .

The first, optional until recently, requires us to send our selfies to the command from the services. By sending a photo of our beautiful face, we confirm that we are where we have declared that we will spend quarantine. If we do not follow the command sent to the phone in 20 minutes, information about our tardiness will go to the police or city guard, for which it will be a signal to check what we are doing - we sleep, we are in the toilet, or we are walking in the surrounding park, having sincerely, the obligation to sit at home.

There are two problems with this application. First, the government cannot make the source code available to it in open access, because the application is a modified commercial solution and its license does not allow it. This is not a serious problem, but certainly not the best practice that would be better used for government applications. Worse, that data from Quarantine can be stored for 6 years, which is not only a surprisingly long period, but also completely devoid of any reasonable justification.

The second application, ProteGO, is just being developed, and the solutions proposed in it have been given for public discussion. This is a modification of the Bluetooth-based solution from Singapore. ProteGO is to collect information on the phone about who we are in contact with. If it turns out that one of the people in whose range we were, was a carrier of the extremely contagious coronavirus, we will be informed and we can take appropriate precautions.

The solutions presented so far by the ministry were not perfect, but they did not raise such serious reservations, among others because the way of their functioning and their purpose was clearly defined.

We need technology help, but we can't hang up the privacy

A call for creating tools that strengthen rather than destroy, citizens' confidence in the state was sent to the ruling group of experts and practitioners dealing with privacy and personal data. Among the seven pillars of trust, he mentions, among others: Limiting himself to collecting the necessary amount of data to achieve a specific goal and making it available only to those institutions that pursue this goal. Limiting the storage time of collected data to the necessary minimum (yes, Quarantine is probably a touch to you). Storage of data on the citizen's device. Informing citizens clearly. Panoptico's recommendations seem not so much uncontroversial as they should be obvious. Despite this, the draft amendment confronted with them is not very good.

At the moment, the government is feeling pressure to do something. Some of his actions are precise and right, but there are also actions that do not make sense - ends Klicki's conversation. - Instead of a precise surgical cut, which is to counteract a pandemic, we will be granted the Prime Minister the opportunity to track each of the Poles.

Tools introduced for the time of emergency have the ugly habit of staying with us for longer, which is why it is so important that every change in law introduced during anxiety is carefully analyzed. Especially if it can potentially compromise our privacy or our security.



The government also wants to locate healthy Poles. "Regulations not in accordance with the GDPR and the Constitution"

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